By: Naji Ali Amhaz

The political reality of the Shiite community in Lebanon suffers from a structural flaw, exacerbated by the media and political chaos that has portrayed the Shiites as having lost their strategic balance, transforming them into an imminent danger to the region—particularly after their involvement in "Supporting Gaza." Despite Hezbollah's constant assurances regarding the disciplined nature of this support and its confinement within Lebanese territory, "populist currents" (or what might be termed second-tier powers) in Israel, the West, and even within the Arab world and Lebanon possess agendas that diverge significantly from the deep international decision-making process.

These currents, which confine the international game to narrow patterns, ignore the greater danger tracked by the "Global Decision Maker": the existence of over twenty million "Takfiris" distributed throughout the Arab world, in addition to tens of thousands in Europe, Africa, and even America. These elements constitute a ticking time bomb that threatens stability in the West even before the Middle East.

The "Al-Aqsa Flood" came at the wrong time and moment by all measures, granting Israel's new rulers a chance to market their theory that they can confront the "Muslim Brotherhood" and Takfiris alone, deeming the functional role of the Shiites as having ended. The Israeli lobby based this on the fact that the "Flood" occurred without the prior knowledge of Iran or the Party (Hezbollah). This was exploited to promote the idea of the "decay" of the Islamic Revolution and its axis—a conclusion reinforced by years of ill-advised media and political statements.

Consequently, Israel saw a golden opportunity to suggest to the global order that Iran might slide into chaos due to the flabbiness of its governance, thereby providing Takfiris with fertile ground and a safe passage from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arab world, and from there to the globe. Thus, Tel Aviv argued for the necessity of launching a major war to topple the regime in Tehran and establish a new system that returns Iran to the "American fold" as an ally (similar to the Shah's era).

In this scenario, Washington and Tel Aviv would not object to an "Allied Iran" possessing nuclear energy, or even rebuilding new Shiite groupings, as long as they orbit the American-Israeli sphere. This would be followed by the "Great War on Terror," expected to conclude by 2030.

In the Syrian landscape, the arrival of Ahmed Al-Sharaa to power, and the fall of the previous regime, comes as an attempt to implement this scenario and to prove that Israel is capable of coexisting with and controlling hardline currents. The footage broadcast by Israeli media of soldiers walking freely in Syria in front of Takfiri elements is merely an attempt to cement the theory that "Takfiris do not pose an existential threat to Israel." This is partially true; Israel might protect itself from them, but it is certainly incapable of protecting the world.

The horrific massacres that occurred in Syria against the Druze and Alawites, sweeping through areas like locusts, have reactivated the international alarm bell: the real danger does not lie with the Shiites (even if they are politically "annoying"), but rather with this eliminatory terrorist ideology capable of turning stable states—even those Gulf nations seeking openness and an exit from the religious cloak—into rubble in a moment of negligence. It is also capable of striking deep inside Iran itself.

Even Al-Sharaa himself, originally a defector from this environment, found himself threatened with liquidation by his own hardline soldiers, making his priority today getting rid of them to build a viable state, at least as he envisions it.

Then came the terrorist attacks against Americans in Palmyra, and the recent operation in Australia, to prove that the bet on Israel’s ability to control the rhythm alone has failed. The world realized that nowhere is safe, and that a single individual is capable of throwing an entire continent into chaos.

Here, the fundamental comparison emerges: Shiites are fierce fighters, but they are not radicals or Takfiris; their history of global coexistence bears witness to this. Their problem in the Islamic world resembles the problem of other minorities: they are "declared apostates" (Takfiri target) and targeted, whereas, in the human dimension, they are the closest and best suited for coexistence. Perhaps the election of New York City Mayor "Zohran Mamdani" was the cornerstone proving the possibility of an integrated global Shiite role.

From here, we clearly understand Tom Barrack’s statements that "disarmament is not required," and the US Ambassador to Lebanon’s talk of "containing the weapon"—meaning the requirement is to define the function of this weapon.

Most importantly, President Trump’s recent statement that "Hezbollah represents a problem." In Trump’s political dictionary, the description "problem" means a party that is “annoying” and can be dealt with politically, not an "existential threat" that must be erased. This is a crucial distinction.

This analysis restores the importance of the role of minorities in protecting the shores of the Mediterranean and preventing the flow of terrorism toward Europe. The world needs the Alawites to control the Syrian coast, and the Christians and Shiites to control the Lebanese shores; their absence means Cyprus and Europe transforming into an open playground for terrorists within hours.

In conclusion, when I review how American leaders are today using the exact expressions, terms, and even sentence structures I published months ago—specifically that "disarmament is not required" and that "Shiites have become annoying"—I feel there is no more accurate description than what I wrote.

Here, I wonder about the performance of the "Axis of Resistance" media: was it operating with studied malice to turn the world against the Shiites, transforming them into an "annoying environment" to distract America and Israel, thereby granting a greater opportunity to the Muslim Brotherhood under the slogan "all blood is cheap for Palestine," even if we sacrifice the Shiites? Or was it merely an attempt to achieve Arab nationalist and leftist dreams? Or was it acting with blatant stupidity? In all cases, the result is the same.

Trump’s words are clear, and the deadline is short (half a year) for the world to understand what we want.

Will we remain prisoners of the noise of Arab nationalisms and the slogans of the demagogic Left—which have vanished even in their homelands—and attempts to "outsmart" everyone by joining Islamic currents like the Muslim Brotherhood, while their project is larger than the Shiites and the world, extending from Afghanistan to Palestine (which is their right)? Or will we close ranks like other minorities.

Share

Comments

Add your comment