By: Naji Ali Amhaz

Why did the war end? If the Shias truly realized what was being prepared for them, they would believe with certainty that their survival was nothing short of a miracle. The world’s distraction with its war on terror— as we see happening today in places like Australia—halted what was almost a complete attempt at their political, military, and existential annihilation. Israel sought an open war, ending with the elimination of Hezbollah and the expulsion of Shias from Southern Lebanon. The United States, for its part, makes no secret of its desire to rid itself of Hezbollah and the Shia community, who constitute a constant source of disruption to its projects in the Arab Levant. Even Hezbollah’s opponents in the Lebanese political conflict—legitimate as that rivalry may be within the democratic game—want Hezbollah finished because it curbs the expansion of their power and opposes them. Even the Lebanese "corrupt system" viewed such a war as a lifeline. They know that the Americans and Europeans are determined to open the corruption file in Lebanon— a file no less important to them than Hezbollah’s weapons, and perhaps even higher on their priority list.

The matter did not stop there. Even the allies and followers of Bashar al-Assad—Lebanese and Syrian politicians, military figures, and media personalities—wanted the war against the Shias in Lebanon to continue. Why? Because any comprehensive political solution would inevitably lead to everyone turning their attention to holding them accountable, prosecuting them, and exposing their roles and responsibilities. Add to that the Muslim Brotherhood and Arab Nationalists, who view the Shia community’s continued involvement in the war—driven by its embrace of the Palestinian cause—as a threat to their own "backyard."

In sum, striking the Party and the Shia sect would lead to Iran’s exit from the Arab equation, transforming it into a state we hear about only as the Sunni community hears about events in Pakistan or Afghanistan. To put it more clearly: Everyone’s interests intersected in striking Hezbollah and the Shia sect, except for people like us—Shias who were working to spare the community this dark fate.

Furthermore, the answer lies not only in the military balance of power but in the factor of time. The United States no longer has the luxury of prolonging conflicts, especially in Southern Lebanon, where two goals intersect: an American desire to wrap up pending files quickly, and an Israeli desire to settle the security of its northern border once and for all. After the experience of "Al-Aqsa Flood," Israel made an unequivocal decision: it will no longer accept the presence of any hostile force, or even an unsecured one, within ten kilometers of its border, to prevent a recurrence of October 7. This is a non-negotiable security condition. Washington cannot override it, nor can it accept a continuing war that drains time and drowns the region in further chaos without a real political horizon.

From here, what can be called the "American Proposal" was born: the Southern region is presented rhetorically as economic and developmental, but in essence, it is a security buffer zone where any presence classified as hostile to Israel is forbidden. In this context, the continued Israeli assassinations in the South, particularly south of the Litani River, cannot be separated from this project. These operations are not situational reactions; they are preparatory measures aimed at "emptying" the area of any element that might pose a future threat, paving the way for the launch of the so-called "Economic Zone" and attracting investments in oil and tourism.

In practical terms, we are facing a new scene that redraws Lebanon into two clear American zones of influence:

1. South of the Litani: Managed as a security-economic zone where "order" is imposed by force, fire, and strict surveillance.

2. Mount Lebanon and the North: Managed as a political-administrative zone where influence is imposed via politics and soft power.

The deep objective of this division is not stability per se, but control, management, and investment—specifically in Oil Block No. 4 facing Mount Lebanon, and Block No. 9 in the South. This scene was not a surprise to me. I monitored it and wrote about it repeatedly before 2022. In an article published on July 31, 2021, titled "Repercussions of the August 4 Explosion and Lebanon's New System," I clearly indicated that the West would move to consider Mount Lebanon a "safe zone" and would work to expel anti-Western forces from it under security and political pretexts. I also wrote about the expansion of Turkish influence in the North, which we see clearly today in Akkar and Tripoli, where a vast majority has moved within the orbit of supporting this legitimacy, confirming the accuracy of those readings.

In light of this vision, and at the height of Shia power and the reach of the Axis of Resistance, I did not imagine that Hezbollah would enter into a military confrontation—even a side one—with Israel. Everyone was waiting for a single spark to implement this scenario: transforming Lebanon into a "Libya-like model," where international powers partition influence and wealth—American and Turkish on one side, French on the other. However, it seems today that the Party fell into a trap of massive political and media deception. Perhaps the Russian-Ukrainian war also contributed to accelerating this path by distracting Moscow and pushing it out of the warm waters of the Mediterranean.

What Reda Al-Basha revealed about the role of parties within the Syrian leadership in facilitating the assassination of Iranians—and inevitably Lebanese Hezbollah members—constitutes a political "earthquake." It is an earthquake that places the Shias before a painful question: Is it conceivable that media figures and politicians loyal to Bashar al-Assad, who control the "Axis" media, played a key role in misleading the Shias by fabricating internal crises with the Lebanese and Arab societies to isolate them and exploit them to the maximum, serving their own interests and the Syrian regime’s interests? And can the dominance of these figures over the media be separated from their influence on the Iranian Embassy in Lebanon, which appeared held captive by the ideology of these figures—nationalists and leftists—isolated from the broader Lebanese reality?

More dangerously, this blackout was not limited to politics and media. I, for example, have never recorded a single hostile stance against Iran or the Party. Yet, for over 13 years, I have confronted the media of the "Resistance Axis" and its political narrative, which contributed to turning public opinion against the Shias. However, the criterion for acceptance or exclusion by the "report writers" (informants) of the Syrian regime was not how one serves the sect or national unity, but rather how one serves Bashar al-Assad, even at the expense of the sect. People like us, who have opposed the Syrian regime for decades, were excluded.

The result was a political and media failure for Hezbollah, and a parallel failure for Iran to build real political influence inside Lebanon, despite being a major regional power. Ironically, this group that dominates the media and political discourse is incapable of change because it is a partner with Assad.

I have been asked repeatedly why I did not participate in the memorial service for Hajj Mohammed Afif at the Iranian Embassy. The truth is, I am not organizationally affiliated with Hezbollah or Iran, but no one denies my grief over his loss. When I asked why I wasn't invited, it became clear that there are those who "filter" names and invitations. This left a deep sense of grievance in my heart towards Iran, even though I have defended it repeatedly in deep political debates, even against Maronite elites who used to tell me: "The Persian is skilled at weaving carpets, but the Ottoman is better at crafting power." Today, it seems their words were not without basis.

The Shias have paid a heavy price, and what is more dangerous is that the coming phase will be political and more lethal than military war. As for the south of the Litani, it is expected that within months America will lay its hand on it through "Trump’s Economic Zone" as an elegant cover for a clear isolation project, based on three pillars:

1. Security via Economy: Establishing a special economic zone whose actual goal is disarming Hezbollah and securing the border.

2. Disguised Displacement: Emptying border villages of their residents and turning them into industrial/tourism zones, creating a security belt without direct occupation.

3. The Gaza Model: Repeating the idea of "Economic Peace" (Gaza Riviera), transforming the population from resistance fighters into laborers within a controlled prosperity and conditional funding.

Conclusion:

Lebanon today stands between the hammer of international pressure and the anvil of internal division. While the Shias are placed between a rock and a hard place, facing an existential challenge aimed at re-engineering the South demographically and politically, and stripping it of its resistance identity, one thing is certain: What is being drawn for Lebanon is a dangerous functional division—a South for security investment, and a North for political influence. The Shia community must, today before tomorrow, clean its internal house of the "report writers" and misleaders, before the door of accountability closes forever.

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